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https://gitea.com/gitea/act_runner.git
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5edc4ba550
Closes #848. Addresses [GHSA-82g9-637c-2fx2](https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-82g9-637c-2fx2) and the follow-up points raised by @ChristopherHX and @haroutp in that thread. The change is breaking only for `cache.external_server` which uses auth via a pre-shared secret. ## How auth works now 1. **Runner starts** → opens the embedded cache server on `:port`. Loads / creates a 32-byte HMAC signing key in `<cache-dir>/.secret`. 2. **Runner receives a task** → calls `handler.RegisterJob(ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN, repository)` before the job runs, defers a revoker that removes the credential on completion. Registrations are reference-counted so a stray re-register cannot revoke a live job. 3. **Job container runs `actions/cache`** → the toolkit sends `Authorization: Bearer $ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN` on every management call (`reserve`, `upload`, `commit`, `find`, `clean`). The cache server's middleware looks the token up in the registered-jobs map: miss → 401; hit → the job's repository is injected into the request context. 4. **Repository scoping** — every cache entry is stamped with `Repo` on reserve; `find`, `upload`, `commit` all verify the caller's repo matches. A job in repo A cannot see or poison a cache entry owned by repo B, even when both reach the server over the same docker bridge. GC dedup also groups by `(Repo, Key, Version)` so one repo can't age out another. 5. **Archive downloads** — `@actions/cache` does not attach Authorization when downloading `archiveLocation`, so the `find` response is a short-lived HMAC-signed URL: `…/artifacts/:id?exp=<unix>&sig=<hmac>`, 10-minute TTL, signature binds `cacheID:exp`. Tampered, expired, or foreign-secret URLs get 401. 6. **Defence-in-depth** — `ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN` is added to `task.Secrets` so the runner's log masker scrubs it from step output. ## `cache.external_server` (standalone `act_runner cache-server`) Operators set `cache.external_secret` to the same value on the runner config and the `act_runner cache-server` config. The `cache-server` then runs with bearer auth on the cache API and exposes a control-plane at `POST /_internal/{register,revoke}` (gated by the shared secret). The runner pre-registers each task's `ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN` with the remote server before the job runs and revokes it on completion. Same per-job auth + repo scoping as the embedded handler, just over the network. `cache-server` refuses to start without `cache.external_secret`; runner config load also fails when `cache.external_server` is set without `cache.external_secret`. ## User-facing changes - **One-time cache miss after upgrade.** Pre-existing entries in `bolt.db` have no `Repo` stamp and won't match any job — they'll be evicted by the normal GC. First job per cache key rebuilds its cache. - **`cache.external_server` deployments must add `cache.external_secret`.** Breaking change for anyone running a standalone `act_runner cache-server`: set the same `cache.external_secret` in both the runner config and the cache-server config. Without it neither side starts. - **No config changes required for the default setup.** Runners using the embedded cache server (the common case) keep working without any yaml edits; the auth mechanism is invisible to workflows. --- This PR was written with the help of Claude Opus 4.7 --------- Co-authored-by: Nicolas <bircni@icloud.com> Co-authored-by: Christopher Homberger <christopher.homberger@web.de> Reviewed-on: https://gitea.com/gitea/act_runner/pulls/849 Reviewed-by: ChristopherHX <38043+christopherhx@noreply.gitea.com>
42 lines
940 B
Go
42 lines
940 B
Go
// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
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package config
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import (
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"testing"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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)
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func TestLoadDefault_RejectsExternalServerWithoutSecret(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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path := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yaml")
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require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`
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cache:
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enabled: true
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external_server: "http://cache.invalid/"
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`), 0o600))
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_, err := LoadDefault(path)
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require.Error(t, err)
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assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "external_secret")
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}
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func TestLoadDefault_AcceptsExternalServerWithSecret(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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path := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yaml")
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require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`
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cache:
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enabled: true
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external_server: "http://cache.invalid/"
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external_secret: "shh"
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`), 0o600))
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_, err := LoadDefault(path)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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}
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