Files
act_runner/act/artifactcache/handler.go
silverwind 5edc4ba550 Authenticate cache requests via ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN and scope by repo (#849)
Closes #848. Addresses [GHSA-82g9-637c-2fx2](https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-82g9-637c-2fx2) and the follow-up points raised by @ChristopherHX and @haroutp in that thread.

The change is breaking only for `cache.external_server` which uses auth via a pre-shared secret.

## How auth works now

1. **Runner starts** → opens the embedded cache server on `:port`. Loads / creates a 32-byte HMAC signing key in `<cache-dir>/.secret`.
2. **Runner receives a task** → calls `handler.RegisterJob(ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN, repository)` before the job runs, defers a revoker that removes the credential on completion. Registrations are reference-counted so a stray re-register cannot revoke a live job.
3. **Job container runs `actions/cache`** → the toolkit sends `Authorization: Bearer $ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN` on every management call (`reserve`, `upload`, `commit`, `find`, `clean`). The cache server's middleware looks the token up in the registered-jobs map: miss → 401; hit → the job's repository is injected into the request context.
4. **Repository scoping** — every cache entry is stamped with `Repo` on reserve; `find`, `upload`, `commit` all verify the caller's repo matches. A job in repo A cannot see or poison a cache entry owned by repo B, even when both reach the server over the same docker bridge. GC dedup also groups by `(Repo, Key, Version)` so one repo can't age out another.
5. **Archive downloads** — `@actions/cache` does not attach Authorization when downloading `archiveLocation`, so the `find` response is a short-lived HMAC-signed URL: `…/artifacts/:id?exp=<unix>&sig=<hmac>`, 10-minute TTL, signature binds `cacheID:exp`. Tampered, expired, or foreign-secret URLs get 401.
6. **Defence-in-depth** — `ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN` is added to `task.Secrets` so the runner's log masker scrubs it from step output.

## `cache.external_server` (standalone `act_runner cache-server`)

Operators set `cache.external_secret` to the same value on the runner config and the `act_runner cache-server` config. The `cache-server` then runs with bearer auth on the cache API and exposes a control-plane at `POST /_internal/{register,revoke}` (gated by the shared secret). The runner pre-registers each task's `ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN` with the remote server before the job runs and revokes it on completion. Same per-job auth + repo scoping as the embedded handler, just over the network.

`cache-server` refuses to start without `cache.external_secret`; runner config load also fails when `cache.external_server` is set without `cache.external_secret`.

## User-facing changes

- **One-time cache miss after upgrade.** Pre-existing entries in `bolt.db` have no `Repo` stamp and won't match any job — they'll be evicted by the normal GC. First job per cache key rebuilds its cache.
- **`cache.external_server` deployments must add `cache.external_secret`.** Breaking change for anyone running a standalone `act_runner cache-server`: set the same `cache.external_secret` in both the runner config and the cache-server config. Without it neither side starts.
- **No config changes required for the default setup.** Runners using the embedded cache server (the common case) keep working without any yaml edits; the auth mechanism is invisible to workflows.

---
This PR was written with the help of Claude Opus 4.7

---------

Co-authored-by: Nicolas <bircni@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: Christopher Homberger <christopher.homberger@web.de>
Reviewed-on: https://gitea.com/gitea/act_runner/pulls/849
Reviewed-by: ChristopherHX <38043+christopherhx@noreply.gitea.com>
2026-04-27 23:59:20 +00:00

886 lines
25 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2023 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
// Copyright 2023 The nektos/act Authors. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package artifactcache
import (
"context"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"regexp"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"gitea.com/gitea/act_runner/act/common"
"github.com/julienschmidt/httprouter"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/timshannon/bolthold"
"go.etcd.io/bbolt"
)
const (
apiPath = "/_apis/artifactcache"
internalPath = "/_internal"
// artifactURLTTL bounds how long a signed artifactLocation URL stays valid.
// Short enough that a leaked URL is near-worthless; long enough to let the
// @actions/cache client download a big blob that was returned from /cache.
artifactURLTTL = 10 * time.Minute
)
type credKey struct{}
// JobCredential ties a per-job bearer token (ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN) to the
// repository that owns it. Every cache entry is stamped with Repo on
// reserve/commit and checked on read/write so one repo can never observe or
// poison another repo's cache, even from inside a container that reaches the
// cache server over the docker bridge network.
type JobCredential struct {
Repo string
}
// credEntry holds a registered job's credential along with an active
// registration count. RegisterJob is reference-counted so that if two tasks
// briefly share an ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN — e.g. a runner that retries a task
// after a crash before the old registration is revoked — the first task's
// revoker does not cut the second task's auth out from under it.
type credEntry struct {
cred JobCredential
refs int
}
type Handler struct {
dir string
storage *Storage
router *httprouter.Router
listener net.Listener
server *http.Server
logger logrus.FieldLogger
gcing atomic.Bool
gcAt time.Time
outboundIP string
// internalSecret guards /_internal/{register,revoke}. When set, a remote
// runner can use these endpoints to pre-register per-job
// ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKENs against this server, enabling the same
// per-job auth and repo scoping as the embedded handler over the
// network. Empty disables the control-plane entirely.
internalSecret string
// secret signs short-lived artifact download URLs. The @actions/cache
// toolkit does not send Authorization on the download request, so blob
// GETs authenticate via a per-URL HMAC signature with expiry rather than
// via the bearer token used for management endpoints.
secret []byte
credMu sync.RWMutex
creds map[string]*credEntry
}
// StartHandler opens the on-disk cache store and starts the HTTP server.
//
// internalSecret, when non-empty, enables a control-plane API at
// /_internal/{register,revoke} that lets a remote runner pre-register the
// per-job ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKENs it expects this server to honor. The
// embedded in-process handler leaves it empty and registers tokens via the
// in-process RegisterJob method directly.
func StartHandler(dir, outboundIP string, port uint16, internalSecret string, logger logrus.FieldLogger) (*Handler, error) {
h := &Handler{
creds: make(map[string]*credEntry),
internalSecret: internalSecret,
}
if logger == nil {
discard := logrus.New()
discard.Out = io.Discard
logger = discard
}
logger = logger.WithField("module", "artifactcache")
h.logger = logger
if dir == "" {
home, err := os.UserHomeDir()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
dir = filepath.Join(home, ".cache", "actcache")
}
if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o755); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
h.dir = dir
storage, err := NewStorage(filepath.Join(dir, "cache"))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
h.storage = storage
if outboundIP != "" {
h.outboundIP = outboundIP
} else if ip := common.GetOutboundIP(); ip == nil {
return nil, errors.New("unable to determine outbound IP address")
} else {
h.outboundIP = ip.String()
}
secret, err := loadOrCreateSecret(dir)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
h.secret = secret
router := httprouter.New()
router.GET(apiPath+"/cache", h.bearerAuth(h.find))
router.POST(apiPath+"/caches", h.bearerAuth(h.reserve))
router.PATCH(apiPath+"/caches/:id", h.bearerAuth(h.upload))
router.POST(apiPath+"/caches/:id", h.bearerAuth(h.commit))
router.POST(apiPath+"/clean", h.bearerAuth(h.clean))
// Artifact GET is signed via query-string HMAC because @actions/cache
// does not attach Authorization when downloading archiveLocation.
router.GET(apiPath+"/artifacts/:id", h.signedURLAuth(h.get))
// Control-plane: a remote runner registers/revokes per-job tokens so the
// cache API can authenticate them. Always wired so the routes exist; the
// handlers themselves 401 when internalSecret is unset.
router.POST(internalPath+"/register", h.internalAuth(h.internalRegister))
router.POST(internalPath+"/revoke", h.internalAuth(h.internalRevoke))
h.router = router
h.gcCache()
// Listen on all interfaces. Binding to outboundIP only would give no real
// security benefit (it is the LAN/internet-facing address either way) and
// can break Docker Desktop variants where the host's outbound IP is not
// routable from inside the container network. Authentication is enforced
// by the bearer middleware and per-repo scoping, not by reachability.
listener, err := net.Listen("tcp", fmt.Sprintf(":%d", port))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
server := &http.Server{
ReadHeaderTimeout: 2 * time.Second,
Handler: router,
}
go func() {
if err := server.Serve(listener); err != nil && errors.Is(err, net.ErrClosed) {
logger.Errorf("http serve: %v", err)
}
}()
h.listener = listener
h.server = server
return h, nil
}
func (h *Handler) ExternalURL() string {
// TODO: make the external url configurable if necessary
return fmt.Sprintf("http://%s:%d",
h.outboundIP,
h.listener.Addr().(*net.TCPAddr).Port)
}
// RegisterJob makes token a valid bearer credential for cache requests from
// the given repository and returns a function that removes it. The runner
// calls this at job start and defers the returned func so that the credential
// is only accepted while the job is running.
//
// Registrations are reference-counted: if a token is already registered, the
// existing repo is kept and the refcount is incremented. The entry is
// removed only when every revoker returned by RegisterJob has been called.
// This keeps a stray re-registration from silently revoking a live job.
func (h *Handler) RegisterJob(token, repo string) func() {
if h == nil || token == "" {
return func() {}
}
h.credMu.Lock()
if existing, ok := h.creds[token]; ok {
existing.refs++
} else {
h.creds[token] = &credEntry{
cred: JobCredential{Repo: repo},
refs: 1,
}
}
h.credMu.Unlock()
return func() {
h.credMu.Lock()
if entry, ok := h.creds[token]; ok {
entry.refs--
if entry.refs <= 0 {
delete(h.creds, token)
}
}
h.credMu.Unlock()
}
}
// RevokeJob explicitly revokes one registration of token, mirroring one call
// of the closure returned by RegisterJob. Used by the control-plane endpoint
// so a remote runner can revoke without holding the closure.
func (h *Handler) RevokeJob(token string) {
if h == nil || token == "" {
return
}
h.credMu.Lock()
if entry, ok := h.creds[token]; ok {
entry.refs--
if entry.refs <= 0 {
delete(h.creds, token)
}
}
h.credMu.Unlock()
}
func (h *Handler) lookupCredential(token string) (JobCredential, bool) {
h.credMu.RLock()
entry, ok := h.creds[token]
h.credMu.RUnlock()
if !ok {
return JobCredential{}, false
}
return entry.cred, true
}
// loadOrCreateSecret returns the 32-byte HMAC signing key for artifact URLs,
// persisted in dir/.secret so signed URLs handed out before a restart stay
// valid across the restart and so the standalone cache-server can be pointed
// at by config.Cache.ExternalServer without the URL rotating.
func loadOrCreateSecret(dir string) ([]byte, error) {
path := filepath.Join(dir, ".secret")
if data, err := os.ReadFile(path); err == nil {
if secret, err := hex.DecodeString(strings.TrimSpace(string(data))); err == nil && len(secret) >= 32 {
return secret, nil
}
} else if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read cache secret: %w", err)
}
secret := make([]byte, 32)
if _, err := rand.Read(secret); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("generate cache secret: %w", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(hex.EncodeToString(secret)), 0o600); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("write cache secret: %w", err)
}
return secret, nil
}
func (h *Handler) Close() error {
if h == nil {
return nil
}
var retErr error
if h.server != nil {
err := h.server.Close()
if err != nil {
retErr = err
}
h.server = nil
}
if h.listener != nil {
err := h.listener.Close()
if errors.Is(err, net.ErrClosed) {
err = nil
}
if err != nil {
retErr = err
}
h.listener = nil
}
return retErr
}
func (h *Handler) openDB() (*bolthold.Store, error) {
return bolthold.Open(filepath.Join(h.dir, "bolt.db"), 0o644, &bolthold.Options{
Encoder: json.Marshal,
Decoder: json.Unmarshal,
Options: &bbolt.Options{
Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
NoGrowSync: bbolt.DefaultOptions.NoGrowSync,
FreelistType: bbolt.DefaultOptions.FreelistType,
},
})
}
// GET /_apis/artifactcache/cache
func (h *Handler) find(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, _ httprouter.Params) {
cred := credFromContext(r.Context())
keys := strings.Split(r.URL.Query().Get("keys"), ",")
// cache keys are case insensitive
for i, key := range keys {
keys[i] = strings.ToLower(key)
}
version := r.URL.Query().Get("version")
db, err := h.openDB()
if err != nil {
h.responseJSON(w, r, 500, err)
return
}
defer db.Close()
cache, err := findCache(db, cred.Repo, keys, version)
if err != nil {
h.responseJSON(w, r, 500, err)
return
}
if cache == nil {
h.responseJSON(w, r, 204)
return
}
if ok, err := h.storage.Exist(cache.ID); err != nil {
h.responseJSON(w, r, 500, err)
return
} else if !ok {
_ = db.Delete(cache.ID, cache)
h.responseJSON(w, r, 204)
return
}
h.responseJSON(w, r, 200, map[string]any{
"result": "hit",
"archiveLocation": h.signedArtifactURL(cache.ID, time.Now().Add(artifactURLTTL)),
"cacheKey": cache.Key,
})
}
// POST /_apis/artifactcache/caches
func (h *Handler) reserve(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, _ httprouter.Params) {
cred := credFromContext(r.Context())
api := &Request{}
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(api); err != nil {
h.responseJSON(w, r, 400, err)
return
}
// cache keys are case insensitive
api.Key = strings.ToLower(api.Key)
cache := api.ToCache()
cache.Repo = cred.Repo
db, err := h.openDB()
if err != nil {
h.responseJSON(w, r, 500, err)
return
}
defer db.Close()
now := time.Now().Unix()
cache.CreatedAt = now
cache.UsedAt = now
if err := insertCache(db, cache); err != nil {
h.responseJSON(w, r, 500, err)
return
}
h.responseJSON(w, r, 200, map[string]any{
"cacheId": cache.ID,
})
}
// PATCH /_apis/artifactcache/caches/:id
func (h *Handler) upload(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, params httprouter.Params) {
cred := credFromContext(r.Context())
id, err := strconv.ParseInt(params.ByName("id"), 10, 64)
if err != nil {
h.responseJSON(w, r, 400, err)
return
}
cache := &Cache{}
db, err := h.openDB()
if err != nil {
h.responseJSON(w, r, 500, err)
return
}
defer db.Close()
if err := db.Get(id, cache); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, bolthold.ErrNotFound) {
h.responseJSON(w, r, 400, fmt.Errorf("cache %d: not reserved", id))
return
}
h.responseJSON(w, r, 500, err)
return
}
if cache.Repo != cred.Repo {
h.responseJSON(w, r, 403, fmt.Errorf("cache %d: forbidden", id))
return
}
if cache.Complete {
h.responseJSON(w, r, 400, fmt.Errorf("cache %v %q: already complete", cache.ID, cache.Key))
return
}
db.Close()
start, _, err := parseContentRange(r.Header.Get("Content-Range"))
if err != nil {
h.responseJSON(w, r, 400, err)
return
}
if err := h.storage.Write(cache.ID, start, r.Body); err != nil {
h.responseJSON(w, r, 500, err)
}
h.useCache(id)
h.responseJSON(w, r, 200)
}
// POST /_apis/artifactcache/caches/:id
func (h *Handler) commit(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, params httprouter.Params) {
cred := credFromContext(r.Context())
id, err := strconv.ParseInt(params.ByName("id"), 10, 64)
if err != nil {
h.responseJSON(w, r, 400, err)
return
}
cache := &Cache{}
db, err := h.openDB()
if err != nil {
h.responseJSON(w, r, 500, err)
return
}
defer db.Close()
if err := db.Get(id, cache); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, bolthold.ErrNotFound) {
h.responseJSON(w, r, 400, fmt.Errorf("cache %d: not reserved", id))
return
}
h.responseJSON(w, r, 500, err)
return
}
if cache.Repo != cred.Repo {
h.responseJSON(w, r, 403, fmt.Errorf("cache %d: forbidden", id))
return
}
if cache.Complete {
h.responseJSON(w, r, 400, fmt.Errorf("cache %v %q: already complete", cache.ID, cache.Key))
return
}
db.Close()
size, err := h.storage.Commit(cache.ID, cache.Size)
if err != nil {
h.responseJSON(w, r, 500, err)
return
}
// write real size back to cache, it may be different from the current value when the request doesn't specify it.
cache.Size = size
db, err = h.openDB()
if err != nil {
h.responseJSON(w, r, 500, err)
return
}
defer db.Close()
cache.Complete = true
if err := db.Update(cache.ID, cache); err != nil {
h.responseJSON(w, r, 500, err)
return
}
h.responseJSON(w, r, 200)
}
// GET /_apis/artifactcache/artifacts/:id
// Authenticated via signed URL (see signedURLAuth), not bearer, because the
// @actions/cache toolkit downloads archiveLocation without Authorization.
// Repository scoping is already enforced at find() time; the signature binds
// the URL to the specific cache ID and an expiry.
func (h *Handler) get(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, params httprouter.Params) {
id, err := strconv.ParseInt(params.ByName("id"), 10, 64)
if err != nil {
h.responseJSON(w, r, 400, err)
return
}
h.useCache(id)
h.storage.Serve(w, r, uint64(id))
}
// POST /_apis/artifactcache/clean
func (h *Handler) clean(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, _ httprouter.Params) {
// TODO: don't support force deleting cache entries
// see: https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-workflows/caching-dependencies-to-speed-up-workflows#force-deleting-cache-entries
h.responseJSON(w, r, 200)
}
// bearerAuth resolves ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN against the set of currently
// registered jobs. A match attaches the job's JobCredential to the request
// context; a miss returns 401 before the handler body runs.
func (h *Handler) bearerAuth(handler httprouter.Handle) httprouter.Handle {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, params httprouter.Params) {
h.logger.Debugf("%s %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path)
token := bearerToken(r)
if token == "" {
h.responseJSON(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, errors.New("missing bearer token"))
return
}
cred, ok := h.lookupCredential(token)
if !ok {
h.responseJSON(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, errors.New("unknown bearer token"))
return
}
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), credKey{}, cred)
handler(w, r.WithContext(ctx), params)
go h.gcCache()
}
}
func (h *Handler) signedURLAuth(handler httprouter.Handle) httprouter.Handle {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, params httprouter.Params) {
h.logger.Debugf("%s %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path)
id, err := strconv.ParseInt(params.ByName("id"), 10, 64)
if err != nil {
h.responseJSON(w, r, 400, err)
return
}
expStr := r.URL.Query().Get("exp")
sig := r.URL.Query().Get("sig")
if expStr == "" || sig == "" {
h.responseJSON(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, errors.New("missing signature"))
return
}
exp, err := strconv.ParseInt(expStr, 10, 64)
if err != nil {
h.responseJSON(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, errors.New("invalid expiry"))
return
}
if time.Now().Unix() > exp {
h.responseJSON(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, errors.New("signature expired"))
return
}
expected := h.computeSignature(id, exp)
if !hmac.Equal([]byte(sig), []byte(expected)) {
h.responseJSON(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, errors.New("bad signature"))
return
}
handler(w, r, params)
go h.gcCache()
}
}
// internalAuth gates the control-plane endpoints. The bearer must
// constant-time-equal the configured internalSecret. If the secret is empty,
// the control-plane is disabled and every request gets 404 — which matches
// the upstream nektos/act behavior of "the route does not exist".
func (h *Handler) internalAuth(handler httprouter.Handle) httprouter.Handle {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, params httprouter.Params) {
if h.internalSecret == "" {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
token := bearerToken(r)
if token == "" || !hmac.Equal([]byte(token), []byte(h.internalSecret)) {
h.responseJSON(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, errors.New("internal: bad secret"))
return
}
handler(w, r, params)
}
}
type internalRegisterBody struct {
Token string `json:"token"`
Repo string `json:"repo"`
}
type internalRevokeBody struct {
Token string `json:"token"`
}
// POST /_internal/register
func (h *Handler) internalRegister(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, _ httprouter.Params) {
var body internalRegisterBody
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {
h.responseJSON(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, err)
return
}
if body.Token == "" {
h.responseJSON(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, errors.New("token is required"))
return
}
h.RegisterJob(body.Token, body.Repo)
h.responseJSON(w, r, http.StatusOK)
}
// POST /_internal/revoke
func (h *Handler) internalRevoke(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, _ httprouter.Params) {
var body internalRevokeBody
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {
h.responseJSON(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, err)
return
}
if body.Token == "" {
h.responseJSON(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, errors.New("token is required"))
return
}
h.RevokeJob(body.Token)
h.responseJSON(w, r, http.StatusOK)
}
func bearerToken(r *http.Request) string {
auth := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
const prefix = "Bearer "
if len(auth) > len(prefix) && strings.EqualFold(auth[:len(prefix)], prefix) {
return auth[len(prefix):]
}
return ""
}
func credFromContext(ctx context.Context) JobCredential {
if cred, ok := ctx.Value(credKey{}).(JobCredential); ok {
return cred
}
return JobCredential{}
}
func (h *Handler) computeSignature(cacheID, exp int64) string {
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, h.secret)
fmt.Fprintf(mac, "%d:%d", cacheID, exp)
return hex.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
}
func (h *Handler) signedArtifactURL(cacheID uint64, exp time.Time) string {
expUnix := exp.Unix()
sig := h.computeSignature(int64(cacheID), expUnix)
q := url.Values{}
q.Set("exp", strconv.FormatInt(expUnix, 10))
q.Set("sig", sig)
return fmt.Sprintf("%s%s/artifacts/%d?%s", h.ExternalURL(), apiPath, cacheID, q.Encode())
}
// if not found, return (nil, nil) instead of an error.
func findCache(db *bolthold.Store, repo string, keys []string, version string) (*Cache, error) {
cache := &Cache{}
for _, prefix := range keys {
// if a key in the list matches exactly, don't return partial matches
if err := db.FindOne(cache,
bolthold.Where("Repo").Eq(repo).
And("Key").Eq(prefix).
And("Version").Eq(version).
And("Complete").Eq(true).
SortBy("CreatedAt").Reverse()); err == nil || !errors.Is(err, bolthold.ErrNotFound) {
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("find cache: %w", err)
}
return cache, nil
}
prefixPattern := "^" + regexp.QuoteMeta(prefix)
re, err := regexp.Compile(prefixPattern)
if err != nil {
continue
}
if err := db.FindOne(cache,
bolthold.Where("Repo").Eq(repo).
And("Key").RegExp(re).
And("Version").Eq(version).
And("Complete").Eq(true).
SortBy("CreatedAt").Reverse()); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, bolthold.ErrNotFound) {
continue
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("find cache: %w", err)
}
return cache, nil
}
return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil // pre-existing issue from nektos/act
}
func insertCache(db *bolthold.Store, cache *Cache) error {
if err := db.Insert(bolthold.NextSequence(), cache); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("insert cache: %w", err)
}
// write back id to db
if err := db.Update(cache.ID, cache); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write back id to db: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
func (h *Handler) useCache(id int64) {
db, err := h.openDB()
if err != nil {
return
}
defer db.Close()
cache := &Cache{}
if err := db.Get(id, cache); err != nil {
return
}
cache.UsedAt = time.Now().Unix()
_ = db.Update(cache.ID, cache)
}
const (
keepUsed = 30 * 24 * time.Hour
keepUnused = 7 * 24 * time.Hour
keepTemp = 5 * time.Minute
keepOld = 5 * time.Minute
)
//nolint:gocyclo // function handles many cases
func (h *Handler) gcCache() {
if h.gcing.Load() {
return
}
if !h.gcing.CompareAndSwap(false, true) {
return
}
defer h.gcing.Store(false)
if time.Since(h.gcAt) < time.Hour {
h.logger.Debugf("skip gc: %v", h.gcAt.String())
return
}
h.gcAt = time.Now()
h.logger.Debugf("gc: %v", h.gcAt.String())
db, err := h.openDB()
if err != nil {
return
}
defer db.Close()
// Remove the caches which are not completed for a while, they are most likely to be broken.
var caches []*Cache
if err := db.Find(&caches, bolthold.
Where("UsedAt").Lt(time.Now().Add(-keepTemp).Unix()).
And("Complete").Eq(false),
); err != nil {
h.logger.Warnf("find caches: %v", err)
} else {
for _, cache := range caches {
h.storage.Remove(cache.ID)
if err := db.Delete(cache.ID, cache); err != nil {
h.logger.Warnf("delete cache: %v", err)
continue
}
h.logger.Infof("deleted cache: %+v", cache)
}
}
// Remove the old caches which have not been used recently.
caches = caches[:0]
if err := db.Find(&caches, bolthold.
Where("UsedAt").Lt(time.Now().Add(-keepUnused).Unix()),
); err != nil {
h.logger.Warnf("find caches: %v", err)
} else {
for _, cache := range caches {
h.storage.Remove(cache.ID)
if err := db.Delete(cache.ID, cache); err != nil {
h.logger.Warnf("delete cache: %v", err)
continue
}
h.logger.Infof("deleted cache: %+v", cache)
}
}
// Remove the old caches which are too old.
caches = caches[:0]
if err := db.Find(&caches, bolthold.
Where("CreatedAt").Lt(time.Now().Add(-keepUsed).Unix()),
); err != nil {
h.logger.Warnf("find caches: %v", err)
} else {
for _, cache := range caches {
h.storage.Remove(cache.ID)
if err := db.Delete(cache.ID, cache); err != nil {
h.logger.Warnf("delete cache: %v", err)
continue
}
h.logger.Infof("deleted cache: %+v", cache)
}
}
// Remove the old caches with the same key and version within the same
// repository, keep the latest one. Aggregation must include Repo so two
// repos that happen to share a (key, version) do not evict each other —
// otherwise per-repo scoping holds for reads but one repo can age
// another out after keepOld.
// Also keep the olds which have been used recently for a while in case of the cache is still in use.
if results, err := db.FindAggregate(
&Cache{},
bolthold.Where("Complete").Eq(true),
"Repo", "Key", "Version",
); err != nil {
h.logger.Warnf("find aggregate caches: %v", err)
} else {
for _, result := range results {
if result.Count() <= 1 {
continue
}
result.Sort("CreatedAt")
caches = caches[:0]
result.Reduction(&caches)
for _, cache := range caches[:len(caches)-1] {
if time.Since(time.Unix(cache.UsedAt, 0)) < keepOld {
// Keep it since it has been used recently, even if it's old.
// Or it could break downloading in process.
continue
}
h.storage.Remove(cache.ID)
if err := db.Delete(cache.ID, cache); err != nil {
h.logger.Warnf("delete cache: %v", err)
continue
}
h.logger.Infof("deleted cache: %+v", cache)
}
}
}
}
func (h *Handler) responseJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, code int, v ...any) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
var data []byte
if len(v) == 0 || v[0] == nil {
data, _ = json.Marshal(struct{}{})
} else if err, ok := v[0].(error); ok {
h.logger.Errorf("%v %v: %v", r.Method, r.URL.Path, err)
data, _ = json.Marshal(map[string]any{
"error": err.Error(),
})
} else {
data, _ = json.Marshal(v[0])
}
w.WriteHeader(code)
_, _ = w.Write(data)
}
func parseContentRange(s string) (int64, int64, error) {
// support the format like "bytes 11-22/*" only
s, _, _ = strings.Cut(strings.TrimPrefix(s, "bytes "), "/")
s1, s2, _ := strings.Cut(s, "-")
start, err := strconv.ParseInt(s1, 10, 64)
if err != nil {
return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("parse %q: %w", s, err)
}
stop, err := strconv.ParseInt(s2, 10, 64)
if err != nil {
return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("parse %q: %w", s, err)
}
return start, stop, nil
}