Authenticate cache requests via ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN and scope by repo (#849)

Closes #848. Addresses [GHSA-82g9-637c-2fx2](https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-82g9-637c-2fx2) and the follow-up points raised by @ChristopherHX and @haroutp in that thread.

The change is breaking only for `cache.external_server` which uses auth via a pre-shared secret.

## How auth works now

1. **Runner starts** → opens the embedded cache server on `:port`. Loads / creates a 32-byte HMAC signing key in `<cache-dir>/.secret`.
2. **Runner receives a task** → calls `handler.RegisterJob(ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN, repository)` before the job runs, defers a revoker that removes the credential on completion. Registrations are reference-counted so a stray re-register cannot revoke a live job.
3. **Job container runs `actions/cache`** → the toolkit sends `Authorization: Bearer $ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN` on every management call (`reserve`, `upload`, `commit`, `find`, `clean`). The cache server's middleware looks the token up in the registered-jobs map: miss → 401; hit → the job's repository is injected into the request context.
4. **Repository scoping** — every cache entry is stamped with `Repo` on reserve; `find`, `upload`, `commit` all verify the caller's repo matches. A job in repo A cannot see or poison a cache entry owned by repo B, even when both reach the server over the same docker bridge. GC dedup also groups by `(Repo, Key, Version)` so one repo can't age out another.
5. **Archive downloads** — `@actions/cache` does not attach Authorization when downloading `archiveLocation`, so the `find` response is a short-lived HMAC-signed URL: `…/artifacts/:id?exp=<unix>&sig=<hmac>`, 10-minute TTL, signature binds `cacheID:exp`. Tampered, expired, or foreign-secret URLs get 401.
6. **Defence-in-depth** — `ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN` is added to `task.Secrets` so the runner's log masker scrubs it from step output.

## `cache.external_server` (standalone `act_runner cache-server`)

Operators set `cache.external_secret` to the same value on the runner config and the `act_runner cache-server` config. The `cache-server` then runs with bearer auth on the cache API and exposes a control-plane at `POST /_internal/{register,revoke}` (gated by the shared secret). The runner pre-registers each task's `ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN` with the remote server before the job runs and revokes it on completion. Same per-job auth + repo scoping as the embedded handler, just over the network.

`cache-server` refuses to start without `cache.external_secret`; runner config load also fails when `cache.external_server` is set without `cache.external_secret`.

## User-facing changes

- **One-time cache miss after upgrade.** Pre-existing entries in `bolt.db` have no `Repo` stamp and won't match any job — they'll be evicted by the normal GC. First job per cache key rebuilds its cache.
- **`cache.external_server` deployments must add `cache.external_secret`.** Breaking change for anyone running a standalone `act_runner cache-server`: set the same `cache.external_secret` in both the runner config and the cache-server config. Without it neither side starts.
- **No config changes required for the default setup.** Runners using the embedded cache server (the common case) keep working without any yaml edits; the auth mechanism is invisible to workflows.

---
This PR was written with the help of Claude Opus 4.7

---------

Co-authored-by: Nicolas <bircni@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: Christopher Homberger <christopher.homberger@web.de>
Reviewed-on: https://gitea.com/gitea/act_runner/pulls/849
Reviewed-by: ChristopherHX <38043+christopherhx@noreply.gitea.com>

act/artifactcache/handler.go

@@ -5,17 +5,24 @@
 package artifactcache
 
 import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"regexp"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
+	"sync"
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"time"
 
@@ -28,9 +35,36 @@ import (
 )
 
 const (
-	urlBase = "/_apis/artifactcache"
+	apiPath      = "/_apis/artifactcache"
+	internalPath = "/_internal"
+
+	// artifactURLTTL bounds how long a signed artifactLocation URL stays valid.
+	// Short enough that a leaked URL is near-worthless; long enough to let the
+	// @actions/cache client download a big blob that was returned from /cache.
+	artifactURLTTL = 10 * time.Minute
 )
 
+type credKey struct{}
+
+// JobCredential ties a per-job bearer token (ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN) to the
+// repository that owns it. Every cache entry is stamped with Repo on
+// reserve/commit and checked on read/write so one repo can never observe or
+// poison another repo's cache, even from inside a container that reaches the
+// cache server over the docker bridge network.
+type JobCredential struct {
+	Repo string
+}
+
+// credEntry holds a registered job's credential along with an active
+// registration count. RegisterJob is reference-counted so that if two tasks
+// briefly share an ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN — e.g. a runner that retries a task
+// after a crash before the old registration is revoked — the first task's
+// revoker does not cut the second task's auth out from under it.
+type credEntry struct {
+	cred JobCredential
+	refs int
+}
+
 type Handler struct {
 	dir      string
 	storage  *Storage
@@ -43,10 +77,36 @@ type Handler struct {
 	gcAt  time.Time
 
 	outboundIP string
+
+	// internalSecret guards /_internal/{register,revoke}. When set, a remote
+	// runner can use these endpoints to pre-register per-job
+	// ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKENs against this server, enabling the same
+	// per-job auth and repo scoping as the embedded handler over the
+	// network. Empty disables the control-plane entirely.
+	internalSecret string
+
+	// secret signs short-lived artifact download URLs. The @actions/cache
+	// toolkit does not send Authorization on the download request, so blob
+	// GETs authenticate via a per-URL HMAC signature with expiry rather than
+	// via the bearer token used for management endpoints.
+	secret []byte
+
+	credMu sync.RWMutex
+	creds  map[string]*credEntry
 }
 
-func StartHandler(dir, outboundIP string, port uint16, logger logrus.FieldLogger) (*Handler, error) {
-	h := &Handler{}
+// StartHandler opens the on-disk cache store and starts the HTTP server.
+//
+// internalSecret, when non-empty, enables a control-plane API at
+// /_internal/{register,revoke} that lets a remote runner pre-register the
+// per-job ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKENs it expects this server to honor. The
+// embedded in-process handler leaves it empty and registers tokens via the
+// in-process RegisterJob method directly.
+func StartHandler(dir, outboundIP string, port uint16, internalSecret string, logger logrus.FieldLogger) (*Handler, error) {
+	h := &Handler{
+		creds:          make(map[string]*credEntry),
+		internalSecret: internalSecret,
+	}
 
 	if logger == nil {
 		discard := logrus.New()
@@ -83,19 +143,37 @@ func StartHandler(dir, outboundIP string, port uint16, logger logrus.FieldLogger
 		h.outboundIP = ip.String()
 	}
 
+	secret, err := loadOrCreateSecret(dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	h.secret = secret
+
 	router := httprouter.New()
-	router.GET(urlBase+"/cache", h.middleware(h.find))
-	router.POST(urlBase+"/caches", h.middleware(h.reserve))
-	router.PATCH(urlBase+"/caches/:id", h.middleware(h.upload))
-	router.POST(urlBase+"/caches/:id", h.middleware(h.commit))
-	router.GET(urlBase+"/artifacts/:id", h.middleware(h.get))
-	router.POST(urlBase+"/clean", h.middleware(h.clean))
+	router.GET(apiPath+"/cache", h.bearerAuth(h.find))
+	router.POST(apiPath+"/caches", h.bearerAuth(h.reserve))
+	router.PATCH(apiPath+"/caches/:id", h.bearerAuth(h.upload))
+	router.POST(apiPath+"/caches/:id", h.bearerAuth(h.commit))
+	router.POST(apiPath+"/clean", h.bearerAuth(h.clean))
+	// Artifact GET is signed via query-string HMAC because @actions/cache
+	// does not attach Authorization when downloading archiveLocation.
+	router.GET(apiPath+"/artifacts/:id", h.signedURLAuth(h.get))
+	// Control-plane: a remote runner registers/revokes per-job tokens so the
+	// cache API can authenticate them. Always wired so the routes exist; the
+	// handlers themselves 401 when internalSecret is unset.
+	router.POST(internalPath+"/register", h.internalAuth(h.internalRegister))
+	router.POST(internalPath+"/revoke", h.internalAuth(h.internalRevoke))
 
 	h.router = router
 
 	h.gcCache()
 
-	listener, err := net.Listen("tcp", fmt.Sprintf(":%d", port)) // listen on all interfaces
+	// Listen on all interfaces. Binding to outboundIP only would give no real
+	// security benefit (it is the LAN/internet-facing address either way) and
+	// can break Docker Desktop variants where the host's outbound IP is not
+	// routable from inside the container network. Authentication is enforced
+	// by the bearer middleware and per-repo scoping, not by reachability.
+	listener, err := net.Listen("tcp", fmt.Sprintf(":%d", port))
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
@@ -121,6 +199,91 @@ func (h *Handler) ExternalURL() string {
 		h.listener.Addr().(*net.TCPAddr).Port)
 }
 
+// RegisterJob makes token a valid bearer credential for cache requests from
+// the given repository and returns a function that removes it. The runner
+// calls this at job start and defers the returned func so that the credential
+// is only accepted while the job is running.
+//
+// Registrations are reference-counted: if a token is already registered, the
+// existing repo is kept and the refcount is incremented. The entry is
+// removed only when every revoker returned by RegisterJob has been called.
+// This keeps a stray re-registration from silently revoking a live job.
+func (h *Handler) RegisterJob(token, repo string) func() {
+	if h == nil || token == "" {
+		return func() {}
+	}
+	h.credMu.Lock()
+	if existing, ok := h.creds[token]; ok {
+		existing.refs++
+	} else {
+		h.creds[token] = &credEntry{
+			cred: JobCredential{Repo: repo},
+			refs: 1,
+		}
+	}
+	h.credMu.Unlock()
+	return func() {
+		h.credMu.Lock()
+		if entry, ok := h.creds[token]; ok {
+			entry.refs--
+			if entry.refs <= 0 {
+				delete(h.creds, token)
+			}
+		}
+		h.credMu.Unlock()
+	}
+}
+
+// RevokeJob explicitly revokes one registration of token, mirroring one call
+// of the closure returned by RegisterJob. Used by the control-plane endpoint
+// so a remote runner can revoke without holding the closure.
+func (h *Handler) RevokeJob(token string) {
+	if h == nil || token == "" {
+		return
+	}
+	h.credMu.Lock()
+	if entry, ok := h.creds[token]; ok {
+		entry.refs--
+		if entry.refs <= 0 {
+			delete(h.creds, token)
+		}
+	}
+	h.credMu.Unlock()
+}
+
+func (h *Handler) lookupCredential(token string) (JobCredential, bool) {
+	h.credMu.RLock()
+	entry, ok := h.creds[token]
+	h.credMu.RUnlock()
+	if !ok {
+		return JobCredential{}, false
+	}
+	return entry.cred, true
+}
+
+// loadOrCreateSecret returns the 32-byte HMAC signing key for artifact URLs,
+// persisted in dir/.secret so signed URLs handed out before a restart stay
+// valid across the restart and so the standalone cache-server can be pointed
+// at by config.Cache.ExternalServer without the URL rotating.
+func loadOrCreateSecret(dir string) ([]byte, error) {
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, ".secret")
+	if data, err := os.ReadFile(path); err == nil {
+		if secret, err := hex.DecodeString(strings.TrimSpace(string(data))); err == nil && len(secret) >= 32 {
+			return secret, nil
+		}
+	} else if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("read cache secret: %w", err)
+	}
+	secret := make([]byte, 32)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(secret); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("generate cache secret: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(hex.EncodeToString(secret)), 0o600); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("write cache secret: %w", err)
+	}
+	return secret, nil
+}
+
 func (h *Handler) Close() error {
 	if h == nil {
 		return nil
@@ -160,6 +323,7 @@ func (h *Handler) openDB() (*bolthold.Store, error) {
 
 // GET /_apis/artifactcache/cache
 func (h *Handler) find(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, _ httprouter.Params) {
+	cred := credFromContext(r.Context())
 	keys := strings.Split(r.URL.Query().Get("keys"), ",")
 	// cache keys are case insensitive
 	for i, key := range keys {
@@ -174,7 +338,7 @@ func (h *Handler) find(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, _ httprouter.Para
 	}
 	defer db.Close()
 
-	cache, err := findCache(db, keys, version)
+	cache, err := findCache(db, cred.Repo, keys, version)
 	if err != nil {
 		h.responseJSON(w, r, 500, err)
 		return
@@ -194,13 +358,14 @@ func (h *Handler) find(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, _ httprouter.Para
 	}
 	h.responseJSON(w, r, 200, map[string]any{
 		"result":          "hit",
-		"archiveLocation": fmt.Sprintf("%s%s/artifacts/%d", h.ExternalURL(), urlBase, cache.ID),
+		"archiveLocation": h.signedArtifactURL(cache.ID, time.Now().Add(artifactURLTTL)),
 		"cacheKey":        cache.Key,
 	})
 }
 
 // POST /_apis/artifactcache/caches
 func (h *Handler) reserve(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, _ httprouter.Params) {
+	cred := credFromContext(r.Context())
 	api := &Request{}
 	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(api); err != nil {
 		h.responseJSON(w, r, 400, err)
@@ -210,6 +375,7 @@ func (h *Handler) reserve(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, _ httprouter.P
 	api.Key = strings.ToLower(api.Key)
 
 	cache := api.ToCache()
+	cache.Repo = cred.Repo
 	db, err := h.openDB()
 	if err != nil {
 		h.responseJSON(w, r, 500, err)
@@ -231,6 +397,7 @@ func (h *Handler) reserve(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, _ httprouter.P
 
 // PATCH /_apis/artifactcache/caches/:id
 func (h *Handler) upload(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, params httprouter.Params) {
+	cred := credFromContext(r.Context())
 	id, err := strconv.ParseInt(params.ByName("id"), 10, 64)
 	if err != nil {
 		h.responseJSON(w, r, 400, err)
@@ -253,6 +420,11 @@ func (h *Handler) upload(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, params httprout
 		return
 	}
 
+	if cache.Repo != cred.Repo {
+		h.responseJSON(w, r, 403, fmt.Errorf("cache %d: forbidden", id))
+		return
+	}
+
 	if cache.Complete {
 		h.responseJSON(w, r, 400, fmt.Errorf("cache %v %q: already complete", cache.ID, cache.Key))
 		return
@@ -272,6 +444,7 @@ func (h *Handler) upload(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, params httprout
 
 // POST /_apis/artifactcache/caches/:id
 func (h *Handler) commit(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, params httprouter.Params) {
+	cred := credFromContext(r.Context())
 	id, err := strconv.ParseInt(params.ByName("id"), 10, 64)
 	if err != nil {
 		h.responseJSON(w, r, 400, err)
@@ -294,6 +467,11 @@ func (h *Handler) commit(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, params httprout
 		return
 	}
 
+	if cache.Repo != cred.Repo {
+		h.responseJSON(w, r, 403, fmt.Errorf("cache %d: forbidden", id))
+		return
+	}
+
 	if cache.Complete {
 		h.responseJSON(w, r, 400, fmt.Errorf("cache %v %q: already complete", cache.ID, cache.Key))
 		return
@@ -326,6 +504,10 @@ func (h *Handler) commit(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, params httprout
 }
 
 // GET /_apis/artifactcache/artifacts/:id
+// Authenticated via signed URL (see signedURLAuth), not bearer, because the
+// @actions/cache toolkit downloads archiveLocation without Authorization.
+// Repository scoping is already enforced at find() time; the signature binds
+// the URL to the specific cache ID and an expiry.
 func (h *Handler) get(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, params httprouter.Params) {
 	id, err := strconv.ParseInt(params.ByName("id"), 10, 64)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -344,21 +526,158 @@ func (h *Handler) clean(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, _ httprouter.Par
 	h.responseJSON(w, r, 200)
 }
 
-func (h *Handler) middleware(handler httprouter.Handle) httprouter.Handle {
+// bearerAuth resolves ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN against the set of currently
+// registered jobs. A match attaches the job's JobCredential to the request
+// context; a miss returns 401 before the handler body runs.
+func (h *Handler) bearerAuth(handler httprouter.Handle) httprouter.Handle {
 	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, params httprouter.Params) {
-		h.logger.Debugf("%s %s", r.Method, r.RequestURI)
+		h.logger.Debugf("%s %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path)
+		token := bearerToken(r)
+		if token == "" {
+			h.responseJSON(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, errors.New("missing bearer token"))
+			return
+		}
+		cred, ok := h.lookupCredential(token)
+		if !ok {
+			h.responseJSON(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, errors.New("unknown bearer token"))
+			return
+		}
+		ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), credKey{}, cred)
+		handler(w, r.WithContext(ctx), params)
+		go h.gcCache()
+	}
+}
+
+func (h *Handler) signedURLAuth(handler httprouter.Handle) httprouter.Handle {
+	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, params httprouter.Params) {
+		h.logger.Debugf("%s %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path)
+		id, err := strconv.ParseInt(params.ByName("id"), 10, 64)
+		if err != nil {
+			h.responseJSON(w, r, 400, err)
+			return
+		}
+		expStr := r.URL.Query().Get("exp")
+		sig := r.URL.Query().Get("sig")
+		if expStr == "" || sig == "" {
+			h.responseJSON(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, errors.New("missing signature"))
+			return
+		}
+		exp, err := strconv.ParseInt(expStr, 10, 64)
+		if err != nil {
+			h.responseJSON(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, errors.New("invalid expiry"))
+			return
+		}
+		if time.Now().Unix() > exp {
+			h.responseJSON(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, errors.New("signature expired"))
+			return
+		}
+		expected := h.computeSignature(id, exp)
+		if !hmac.Equal([]byte(sig), []byte(expected)) {
+			h.responseJSON(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, errors.New("bad signature"))
+			return
+		}
 		handler(w, r, params)
 		go h.gcCache()
 	}
 }
 
+// internalAuth gates the control-plane endpoints. The bearer must
+// constant-time-equal the configured internalSecret. If the secret is empty,
+// the control-plane is disabled and every request gets 404 — which matches
+// the upstream nektos/act behavior of "the route does not exist".
+func (h *Handler) internalAuth(handler httprouter.Handle) httprouter.Handle {
+	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, params httprouter.Params) {
+		if h.internalSecret == "" {
+			http.NotFound(w, r)
+			return
+		}
+		token := bearerToken(r)
+		if token == "" || !hmac.Equal([]byte(token), []byte(h.internalSecret)) {
+			h.responseJSON(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, errors.New("internal: bad secret"))
+			return
+		}
+		handler(w, r, params)
+	}
+}
+
+type internalRegisterBody struct {
+	Token string `json:"token"`
+	Repo  string `json:"repo"`
+}
+
+type internalRevokeBody struct {
+	Token string `json:"token"`
+}
+
+// POST /_internal/register
+func (h *Handler) internalRegister(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, _ httprouter.Params) {
+	var body internalRegisterBody
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {
+		h.responseJSON(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, err)
+		return
+	}
+	if body.Token == "" {
+		h.responseJSON(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, errors.New("token is required"))
+		return
+	}
+	h.RegisterJob(body.Token, body.Repo)
+	h.responseJSON(w, r, http.StatusOK)
+}
+
+// POST /_internal/revoke
+func (h *Handler) internalRevoke(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, _ httprouter.Params) {
+	var body internalRevokeBody
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {
+		h.responseJSON(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, err)
+		return
+	}
+	if body.Token == "" {
+		h.responseJSON(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, errors.New("token is required"))
+		return
+	}
+	h.RevokeJob(body.Token)
+	h.responseJSON(w, r, http.StatusOK)
+}
+
+func bearerToken(r *http.Request) string {
+	auth := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
+	const prefix = "Bearer "
+	if len(auth) > len(prefix) && strings.EqualFold(auth[:len(prefix)], prefix) {
+		return auth[len(prefix):]
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
+func credFromContext(ctx context.Context) JobCredential {
+	if cred, ok := ctx.Value(credKey{}).(JobCredential); ok {
+		return cred
+	}
+	return JobCredential{}
+}
+
+func (h *Handler) computeSignature(cacheID, exp int64) string {
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, h.secret)
+	fmt.Fprintf(mac, "%d:%d", cacheID, exp)
+	return hex.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
+}
+
+func (h *Handler) signedArtifactURL(cacheID uint64, exp time.Time) string {
+	expUnix := exp.Unix()
+	sig := h.computeSignature(int64(cacheID), expUnix)
+	q := url.Values{}
+	q.Set("exp", strconv.FormatInt(expUnix, 10))
+	q.Set("sig", sig)
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%s%s/artifacts/%d?%s", h.ExternalURL(), apiPath, cacheID, q.Encode())
+}
+
 // if not found, return (nil, nil) instead of an error.
-func findCache(db *bolthold.Store, keys []string, version string) (*Cache, error) {
+func findCache(db *bolthold.Store, repo string, keys []string, version string) (*Cache, error) {
 	cache := &Cache{}
 	for _, prefix := range keys {
 		// if a key in the list matches exactly, don't return partial matches
 		if err := db.FindOne(cache,
-			bolthold.Where("Key").Eq(prefix).
+			bolthold.Where("Repo").Eq(repo).
+				And("Key").Eq(prefix).
 				And("Version").Eq(version).
 				And("Complete").Eq(true).
 				SortBy("CreatedAt").Reverse()); err == nil || !errors.Is(err, bolthold.ErrNotFound) {
@@ -373,7 +692,8 @@ func findCache(db *bolthold.Store, keys []string, version string) (*Cache, error
 			continue
 		}
 		if err := db.FindOne(cache,
-			bolthold.Where("Key").RegExp(re).
+			bolthold.Where("Repo").Eq(repo).
+				And("Key").RegExp(re).
 				And("Version").Eq(version).
 				And("Complete").Eq(true).
 				SortBy("CreatedAt").Reverse()); err != nil {
@@ -494,12 +814,16 @@ func (h *Handler) gcCache() {
 		}
 	}
 
-	// Remove the old caches with the same key and version, keep the latest one.
+	// Remove the old caches with the same key and version within the same
+	// repository, keep the latest one. Aggregation must include Repo so two
+	// repos that happen to share a (key, version) do not evict each other —
+	// otherwise per-repo scoping holds for reads but one repo can age
+	// another out after keepOld.
 	// Also keep the olds which have been used recently for a while in case of the cache is still in use.
 	if results, err := db.FindAggregate(
 		&Cache{},
 		bolthold.Where("Complete").Eq(true),
-		"Key", "Version",
+		"Repo", "Key", "Version",
 	); err != nil {
 		h.logger.Warnf("find aggregate caches: %v", err)
 	} else {
@@ -533,7 +857,7 @@ func (h *Handler) responseJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, code int,
 	if len(v) == 0 || v[0] == nil {
 		data, _ = json.Marshal(struct{}{})
 	} else if err, ok := v[0].(error); ok {
-		h.logger.Errorf("%v %v: %v", r.Method, r.RequestURI, err)
+		h.logger.Errorf("%v %v: %v", r.Method, r.URL.Path, err)
 		data, _ = json.Marshal(map[string]any{
 			"error": err.Error(),
 		})